Cuba
Another throwback to the cold war, U.S. policy toward Cuba also continues to be conducted via the big stick. Originally rooted in cold war politics and in the U.S. desire to contain Soviet expansionism in the hemisphere, U.S.-Cuba policy is increasingly driven by the electoral strength of conservative Cuban groups in Florida and New Jersey, two states important to winning presidential primaries and elections. Considered a swing state, Florida, for example, has 25 electoral votes (the fourth largest in the country) and a Cuban-American population of over 800,000. In addition, it has become an important source of funding for both Republican and Democratic electoral campaigns. New Jersey, which also has a large Cuban-American population, is a must-win for any presidential contender: No candidate has ever won the presidency without taking that state.

Cuban-American political clout became evident two weeks before the November 1992 elections, when the Bush administration reversed its longstanding opposition to the Cuba Democracy Act, championed by then-Rep. Robert Torricelli, a New Jersey Democrat. (Now a senator, Torricelli has received significant campaign contributions from conservative Cuban-American groups, led by the Cuban American National Foundation, CANF.) At the time, the electoral outcome in Florida was uncertain, and Democrats were touting their support of the measure to gain votes in both Florida and New Jersey.

Several years later, when the Clinton administration took some hesitant steps to relax tensions with Cuba, conservative forces on Capitol Hill responded by introducing the Helms-Burton legislation, tightening the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The downing by Cuban fighter jets in 1996 of two private U.S. planes flown by anti-Castro militants—on an announced mission intended to violate Cuban airspace—assured the passage of Helms-Burton by the U.S. Congress. With the 1996 presidential elections looming, President Clinton reversed his previous position and signed the bill into law. U.S. policy has been frozen in place ever since.

Cuban children playing baseball.	© Margaret Randall

On two occasions the administration has eased some restrictions on humanitarian trade and travel to Cuba, but such tinkering at the margins of U.S. policy does not fundamentally alter the U.S. position that only a Cuba without Castro offers the opportunity for improved relations. Following the visit by Pope John Paul II to Cuba in January 1998, the Clinton administration did relax restrictions on remittances to Cuba, family travel, and the sale of medicines. One year later, in January 1999, additional measures were announced, including expanding remittances allowances, streamlining licensing and visa procedures for cultural and other exchanges, authorizing the sale of food and agricultural inputs to independent non-governmental entities, authorizing direct charter passenger flights to and from cities in addition to Miami and Havana, and seeking to establish direct mail service to Cuba. The timidity of these actions was reflected in the response of the CANF, whose spokesperson announced that they were pleased that the measures incorporated no significant changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba.

The Helms-Burton legislation takes the unprecedented step of attempting to force other countries to enforce the U.S. embargo by punishing foreign corporations for doing business with Cuba, provoking outrage by U.S. allies and foes alike. It also allows U.S. nationals (including Cubans who have become citizens) to sue foreign entities for properties nationalized by the Castro government in the early 1960s. Of particular concern to the international business elite, the law bars entry into the United States to executives of foreign companies (along with their wives and children) who have "trafficked" in these properties. The member nations of the European Union retaliated by filing a complaint with the World Trade Organization, agreeing to suspend it only after the Clinton administration pledged, in principle, to pressure the U.S. Congress for reform of the Helms-Burton legislation.

U.S. efforts to internationalize its economic embargo of Cuba have also met with firm opposition throughout Latin America and have deeply antagonized one of the U.S. government's closest allies, Canada. In its annual General Assembly meeting in June 1996, the Organization of American States (OAS) voted unanimously to reject the Helms-Burton legislation. Subsequently, the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee ruled that Helms-Burton violates international law on at least eight counts. In clear defiance of U.S.-Cuba policy, Canada and Mexico (as well as the European Union) enacted retaliatory legislation that makes it illegal for their citizens to comply with Helms-Burton. Although other countries in the hemisphere have moved to normalize relations with Cuba while encouraging political openings within that country, the U.S. government remains locked in a cold war mentality that will only be satisfied with the ouster of Fidel Castro.

Opposition Growing Inside U.S.
Opposition to U.S.-Cuba policy from within the United States is also growing, while the influence of the Cuban exile community and of the Cuban-American right has begun to diminish. With the death of its powerful and effective founder, Jorge Mas Canosa, the CANF has lost prestige and is no longer the hegemonic force in the Cuban-American community. Moderate Cuban-American voices are becoming more vocal, especially after the Pope's visit, when more than 200 Cuban-Americans came to Washington to participate in a day of Congressional Advocacy and Education. The U.S. business community remains deeply concerned about Helms-Burton-style sanctions and their impact on U.S. business interests worldwide. The Chamber of Commerce, USA Engage (a broad business coalition heavily funded by oil companies), and other business sectors support an end to the trade embargo. Finally, the religious and activist communities are increasingly engaged in advocacy work on Cuba policy, as illustrated in the letter signed during the Pope's visit by more than 150 religious leaders calling for a rethinking of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Growing domestic pressure on the administration will not alter U.S. policy in the near future, but it does lay the groundwork for eventual change.

The only other country in the Caribbean to receive significant U.S. attention is Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Responding to three years of ruthless military rule from 1991 to 1994, the Clinton administration sent 21,000 troops and a multilateral contingent of international police monitors to restore deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In March 1995, a United Nations peacekeeping mission took over, and a UN police mission remains in Haiti.

U.S. engagement in Haiti has proven to be a double-edged sword. While Washington was restoring Aristide to power and working to establish a new civilian police force to replace the abusive security forces of the past, the CIA was undermining democracy-building efforts by supporting those corrupt and abusive forces. The Clinton administration has also been hampered by the hostility of Republican leaders who opposed the intervention and have sought to prove Haiti policies a failure ever since.

The initial euphoria of the return of Aristide quickly wore off, however, as the political and economic situation in Haiti steadily worsened. Many factors underlie this situation, including the lack of a political tradition of participatory democracy, the disintegration of the democratic movement known as "Lavalas" into politically warring factions, a grueling electoral calendar, and the chronic weakness of state institutions. Moreover, more often than not, international donors fail to tailor aid programs to Haitian realities, often providing little support to agriculture in a country where 70% of the population depends on subsistence agriculture for survival.

External Debt by Type, 1996 (billions $U.S.)

Source: Global Finance Development, 1997, Volume 1, Summary Tables.

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